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A House Built on Sand: Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council
The question of whether governments have taken private property
and transformed it for public use without compensating the owner' has
perplexed courts and commentators for many decades.2 When the
United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal Council,3 the decision was expected to have far-reaching im-
plications for land-use law.4 The owner of an oceanfront lot had
challenged a state setback regulation that prohibited the construction of
any habitable structure on the property.5 Stating that the regulation was
a valid exercise of the state's police power, the South Carolina Supreme
Court reversed the lower court's decision to compensate the landowner.6
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed, and re-
manded.7 When the dust had settled, both property rights advocates and
proponents of land-use regulation claimed victory.'
In Lucas,9 the Supreme Court articulated a categorical rule that any
regulation which deprives a landowner of all economically beneficial or
productive use of property requires compensation, unless the regulating
authority can show that the proposed use of the property would not have
been permitted under common-law nuisance principles."0 While Lucas
raises a number of fascinating issues involving administrative and nui-
1. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: "nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
Supreme Court has incorporated the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause into the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process provision so that it applies to the states. See Chicago, B. & Q. R.R.
v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897).
2. See, eg., RicHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGs: PRVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMiNNT DOMAIN 3-31 (1985); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Com-
ments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1165-
72 (1967); Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause." In Search of Underlying Principles Part
I-A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1299, 1301-02 (1989).
3. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
4. See, e.g., John R. Nolon, High Court's "Lucas" Decision Leaves Shifting Sands in
Regulatory Takings Law, N.Y. L.J., July 8, 1992, at 1, 7 (1992) (noting that more than 50
amicus briefs were filed in the case).
5. See infra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
8. See John Echeverria, A Troubling New Ruling on Property Rights, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONrrOR, July 16, 1992, at 19; Jeremy Paul, Scalia's Pursuit of Holy Grail Has Its Price, 131
N.J. L.J. 1087, 1093 (1992).
9. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
10. See id at 2895, 2899-2901.
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sance law,1' this Note will focus only on the Court's creation and de-
scription of its categorical rule. First, the Note presents a brief summary
of the history of Lucas and the Court's opinion.12 The Note then dis-
cusses how courts have treated the issue of deprivation of economic
use.13 The ambiguities of the case are then highlighted as the Note ex-
plores the issue of whether the Lucas rule will prove so narrow as to be
almost useless, or whether it might conceivably represent a broadening of
the scope of compensable takings. 4 The Note concludes by agreeing
with Justice Souter that "[w]hile the issue of what constitutes total depri-
vation deserves the Court's attention, . . . the Court should confront
these matters directly."15
In 1986, David Lucas paid $975,00016 for two oceanfront lots on the
Isle of Palms in South Carolina, on which he planned to erect two single-
family luxury homes. 7 Two years later, South Carolina passed the
Beachfront Management Act of 1988,1 which effectively prevented Lu-
cas from building any permanent habitable structures on the two lots.'
Lucas filed suit in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, alleging
that, because the Coastal Council's regulations governing building re-
quirements had effectively taken his property, he was entitled to compen-
sation.20 In a bench trial, the trial judge awarded him $1.2 million.2'
The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that under Mugler
11. The question of whether the Lucas case was ripe for decision generated much debate
among members of the Court. See id. at 2890-92, 2906-09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id, at
2917-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id, at 2925-26 (Souter, J., separate statement). Similarly, the
Court's assertion that a regulation that deprives a property owner of all economically viable
and productive use must be supported by common-law nuisance principles also created much
furor among the Justices; Justices Blackmun and Stevens accused the Court of both misinter-
preting the line of "police power cases" and of dramatically restricting the ability of legisla-
tures to enact regulations in order to prevent nuisance-like activity. See id. at 2910-17
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 2920-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id at 2903-04 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (criticizing the Court's nuisance exception as being too narrow).
12. See infra notes 16-51 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 52-120 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 121-55 and accompanying text.
15. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2926 (Souter, J., separate statement); see infra note 155 and ac-
companying text.
16. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
17. Id
18. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-250 to -360 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
19. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889-90. The statute in question established a "baseline" using
erosion rates. S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-280(A)(2) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991). Construction of
habitable structures was prohibited seaward of this baseline. Id. § 48-39-280(A). Lucas' lots
were entirely seaward of the line. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 304 S.C. 376,
377, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (1991), rev'd & remanded, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
20. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890.
21. Id (quoting the trial court's finding that the South Carolina Coastal Council "'de-
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v. Kansas22 compensation is not required when a regulation is designed to
prevent harmful or noxious uses of property.23  The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari,' reversed, and remanded.2"
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,26 maintained that, although
regulatory takings cases have traditionally been decided on a fact-specific
basis,27 two categories of regulation have always required compensation:
(1) those that required an owner to suffer a "physical invasion" of his
property, and (2) those that deprived an owner of all "economically ben-
eficial or productive use" of his property.28 The Court justified the latter
category by suggesting that "total deprivation of beneficial use" is, from
the landowner's point of view, the equivalent of a physical appropria-
tion.2 9 Although recognizing that the legislature has a right to readjust
the benefits and burdens of financial life,3" and that the government
prive[d] Lucas of any reasonable economic use of the lots, . . . eliminated the unrestricted right
of use, and render[ed] them valueless' ").
22. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). Mugler upheld a prohibition on the manufacture of intoxicating
liquors on the grounds that local officials had the right to determine "what measures are ap-
propriate or needful for the protection of the public morals, the public health, or the public
safety." Id. at 661; see also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962)
(prohibiting gravel quarry from excavating below the water table); Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394, 414 (1915) (prohibiting brick manufacturing within a residential area).
23. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 304 S.C. 376, 404 S.E.2d 895 (1991).
24. 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991).
25. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2902.
26. Id. at 2886. Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, and Thomas joined. Id. at 2889-902. Justice Ken-
nedy filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Id. at 2902-04 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
the judgment). Justices Blackmun and Stevens fied dissenting opinions. Id. at 2904-17
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); id at 2917-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Souter did not take
part in the decision and ified a separate statement. Id. at 2925-26 (Souter, J., separate state-
ment). Justice Scalia first addressed the Coastal Council's contention that the case was not
ripe for review because there had been amendments to the Beachfront Management Act in
1990, which, the defendants claimed, would possibly enable Lucas to build on his lots. See id.
at 2890-91. The Beachfront Management Act was amended in 1990 to allow for "special
permits" to be issued for construction of habitable structures seaward of the baseline. Id. at
2891 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(D)(1) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991)). Noting that the
South Carolina Supreme Court had chosen to decide the case on its merits, the Court stated
that unless it intervened at this time Lucas would lack any recourse for a temporary takings
claim for 1988-90, the period between the Act's passage and the effective date of the amend-
ments. Id.
27. Id. at 2893; see Pennsylvania Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City (Penn Central), 438
U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962); Richard A.
Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987 Sup. Cr. REv. 1, 4.
28. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893. In earlier cases, the Court had defined this second category
as a deprivation of all "economically viable" uses. See infra notes 71-84 and accompanying
text.
29. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894.
30. Id. (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
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would cease to exist if it had to pay for every diminution in the value of
property,31 the Court found that these assumptions do not apply to total
deprivations and held "that when the owner of real property has been
called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses... he has suf-
fered a taking."132 Nevertheless, the Court articulated an exception to its
total deprivation rule. It stated that a landowner who has suffered a tak-
ing by being deprived of all "economically beneficial and productive use"
will not be compensated when the landowner's use would have been pro-
hibited by common-law property and nuisance principles.33
In an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy differed
with the majority over its exception to the categorical nile.34 Asserting
that the common-law nuisance exception was too narrow in scope, Jus-
tice Kennedy advocated a "reasonable expectations" test that would con-
sider factors in addition to common-law nuisance.35 Justice Kennedy
believed that common-law nuisance principles should not be "the sole
source of state authority to impose severe restrictions ' 36 because, for ex-
ample, "[c]oastal property may present such unique concerns for a fragile
land system" that regulation beyond the confines of common-law nui-
sance principles would be necessary to protect it.37 Justice Kennedy
seemed to suggest that in such a scenario, a court should consider the
reasonable expectations of all parties involved, and if the property owner
could have reasonably expected that such land-use restrictions would
have been implemented, then she would not be entitled to
31. Id; see Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
32. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895. The Court assumed that the lots were rendered valueless
because the Coastal Council did not challenge the trial court finding in its, Brief in Opposition,
and the Court "decline[d] to entertain [that] argument in respondent's brief on the merits." Id.
at 2896 & n.9.
33. Ia at 2899-900. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1967) defines a
public nuisance as "an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public";
A private nuisance is defined as "a nontresspassory invasion of another's interest in the private
use and enjoyment of land." According to the majority, dispositive factors in such an analysis
should include consideration of the traditional uses of the property, an inquiry into whether
other landowners are permitted to continue the use denied to the claimant, an assessment of
the degree of harm posed by the activity, and an examination of whether the harm could easily
be avoided by the landowner, or by other public or private actors. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826-828, §§ 830-831 (1967)).
34. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2902-03 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Ken-
nedy agreed with the Court that the case was ripe for a decision, but opined that the facts gave
rise to a temporary takings analysis. Id. (concurring in the judgment) He recommended that
the South Carolina Court inquire into Lucas' intentions concerning the property during the
two-year period in question. Id. (concurring in the judgment)
35. Id. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S.
164, 173 (1979) and Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
36. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
37. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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compensation.38
In his dissent, Justice Blackmun39 took issue with the majority's as-
sumption that the property had lost all value.4° He explained that if
property is a "bundle of rights" then "[p]etitioner still can enjoy other
attributes of ownership, such as the right to exclude others."41 He enu-
merated several other uses still available to Lucas and asserted that "less
value" was not synonymous with "valueless."14 2  Justice Blackmun's
overriding criticism was that the majority had completely disregarded
precedent that holds that diminution in property value alone is not
enough to constitute an automatic taking.4 3  He believed that the cate-
gorical rule adopted by the majority suggests that "an owner has a con-
stitutionally protected right to harm others, if only he makes the proper
showing of economic loss. '
Justice Stevens also dissented,4' expressing his opposition to both
the Court's new categorical rule and its exception.46 Justice Stevens cited
precedent to refute the Court's contention that a regulation depriving a
property of all economic use automatically should be considered a tak-
38. Interestingly, under Justice Kennedy's analysis, the Coastal Council's regulation
probably should be upheld. Lucas' property is located in an "inlet erosion zone." Id. at 2889
n.1 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). The lots, at various times within the past
twenty years, have been completely underwater. Respondent's Brief on the Merits at 3, Lucas
(No. 91-453). Given these facts, the lots could be described as a "fragile land system" requir-
ing severe restriction. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
39. In addition to his other disagreements with the majority, Justice Blackmun main-
tained that the case should not have been heard until Lucas had exhausted all his available
administrative remedies. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2907 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Because the
plaintiff sought no authorization from the Council as to his property's use, no final agency
decision has been rendered. Id. (Blackmnn, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated that the
Court has consistently held that a takings claim " 'cannot be evaluated until the administrative
agency has arrived at a final, definitive position regarding how it will apply the regulations at
issue to the particular land in question.'" Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 190-91 (1985)).
40. Id at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
41. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
42. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
43. See id. at 2910-11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun cited Mugler v. Kan-
sas, 123 U.S. 623, 664, 668-69 (1887), as "[upholding] an ordinance effectively prohibiting
operation of a previously lawful brewery, although the 'establishments will become of no value
as property,'" and described Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 405 (1915), as "prohibit-
ing a brickyard, although the owner had made excavations on the land that prevented it from
being utilized for any purpose but a brickyard." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2910 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
44. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2912 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
45. See id. at 2917-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens began his dissent by reiter-
ating Justice Blackmun's opinion that the case should not have been considered. Id. at 2917-
18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. See id at 2918-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ing.4 7 He prophesied that the majority holding could produce two dispa-
rate outcomes: either courts could choose to "define 'property' broadly
and only rarely find regulation to effect total takings... or developers
and investors may market specialized estates to take advantage of the
Court's new rule. The smaller the estate, the more likely that a regula-
tory change will effect a total taking."4
While conceding that the issue of regulatory takings was well worth
examining, Justice Souter stated that this case was inappropriate for such
an examination.49 Justice Souter maintained that by focusing its discus-
sion on the common-law nuisance defense to a takings claim, the Court
had approached the issue of total deprivation indirectly and unsatisfacto-
rily.50 He concluded that the writ of certiorari should never have been
granted. 51
The many opinions in Lucas illustrate the struggles, the Court has
endured with the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. 2 The seminal case
concerning regulatory takings was Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.53
The state statute at issue, the Kohler Act, prohibited coal companies
from mining in a manner that would cause the subsidence of any dwell-
ing regardless of whether the coal company owned the mineral rights
underneath that dwelling.54 The Pennsylvania Coal Company claimed
that this statute constituted a taking of their property.55 In an often-
quoted analysis, Justice Holmes reasoned:
Government hardly could go on if to some extent values inci-
dent to property could not be diminished without paying for
47. Id. at 2919 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 490 (1987); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962);
United States v. Caltex,. 344 U.S. 149, 155 (1952); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 279-81
(1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 294, 405 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,
657 (1887)). Justice Stevens appeared further troubled by the fact that the new rule could be
applied in an arbitrary fashion, with a "landowner whose property is diminished in value 95%
[recovering] nothing, while an owner whose property is diminished 100% recovers the land's
full value." Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
49. See id at 2925-26 (Souter, J., separate statement). Justice Souter disagreed with the
Court's decision to hear the case because in view of the 1990 amendments to the Beachfront
Management Act, it is now unclear whether Lucas has in reality been deprived of all economic
use of this property. Id. at 2925 (Souter, J., separate statement) (citing id. at 2890-92); see
supra note 26.
50. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2925 (Souter, J., separate statement).
51. Id at 2926 (Souter, J., separate statement).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation").
53. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
54. Id. at 412-13.
55. Id.
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every such change in the general law.... But obviously the
[regulation] must have its limits, or the contract and due pro-
cess clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining
such limits is the extent in diminution. When it reaches a cer-
tain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exer-
cise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act. -6
Holding that the Kohler Act had made it "commercially impracticable"
for the company to mine their coal, the Court decided that the regulation
had gone "too far" and that the company must be compensated."
Over the next four decades, the question of whether a diminution in
value had reached a magnitude requiring compensation continued to per-
plex the Court."8 In the fifteen years preceding the Lucas decision, how-
ever, the Court has enumerated two different tests to determine whether
a non-invasive regulatory taking has occurred. 9 The Court articulated
the first of these tests in 1978 in Pennsylvania Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City (Penn Central).6 In Penn Central, the plaintiff com-
pany alleged that the application of New York's landmark preservation
law had taken its property because the company had been denied a per-
mit to construct a multi-story office tower above its railroad terminal.6
The owners claimed that the historic preservation commission's denial of
their request to build a multi-story tower atop the railroad terminal con-
stituted a taking because they were allegedly prohibited from exercising
their right to the airspace above the existing building.62 The Penn Cen-
tral Court faced one of the takings clause's most perplexing questions:
how to determine the extent of the property rights at issue, or, as Justice
Scalia wrote in Lucas, Aow to determine "the composition of the denomi-
56. Id. at 413 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 414-15.
58. See, eg., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595-96 (1962) (holding that
ordinance preventing owners of a gravel quarry from excavating underneath the water table
was not a taking); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277 (1928) (holding that destruction of
plaintiff's cedar grove in order to prevent the spreading of disease did not require compensa-
tion); Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (holding that a zoning ordinance
which significantly diminished the value of plaintiff's land did not constitute a taking).
59. The term "non-invasive" is used to denote those regulations that do not involve a
direct physical occupation of the property. In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982), the Court declared that any regulation that resulted in a physical
occupation by any entity other than the property owner was a per se taking that required
compensation. Id. at 435-40. This Note, however, is concerned only with non-invasive regu-
lations.
For an excellent analysis of the Supreme Court's takings tests for both invasive and non-
invasive regulations, see Peterson, supra note 2, at 1317-34.
60. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
61. Id. at 119.
62. Id at 130.
[Vol. 71
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nator in [the] 'deprivation' fraction. 6 3 The denominator denotes the
value of the property before the adverse regulatory action; the numerator
indicates its value after the regulation. The larger the denominator in the
fraction, the less likely it is that the percentage of value lost to regulation
will approximate zero, thus resulting in a taking. Because property is
often described as a "bundle of rights," 6 the determination of what
property should constitute the whole parcel for purposes of calculating
the denominator is not always easy. The Court in Penn Central enumer-
ated three significant factors that should be considered in a regulatory
takings decision: (1) the character of the governmental action,65 (2) the
regulation's "economic impact,, 6 6 and (3) "the extent to which the regu-
lation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations."'67 In
its analysis, the Court stated that "'[t]aking' jurisprudence does not di-
vide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to determine
whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely abrogated."68
Focusing "on the nature and extent of the interference with rights in the
parcel as a whole,"' 69 the Court decided that because the company could
still use the property for a railroad terminal, the ordinance did not pre-
vent it from making "reasonable beneficial use" of the property; hence
there was no taking.7°
The following year, the Court proclaimed its second test for decid-
63. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7. For an analysis of a takings claim as a fraction, see
Michelman, supra note 2, at 1192-93. The deprivation fraction is:
00 [ Value After Regulation 1
Value Before Regulation.
After deciding what extent of the property to consider as the whole, a court must then decide
whether there is any remaining value in the parcel.
64. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (noting that the bundle of
rights characterized as property includes the right to exclude others).
65. The Penn Central Court intimated that if the character of the governmental action
could be equated with a physical invasion and thus resembled an act of eminent domain, then a
taking was more likely to be found. 438 U.S. at 124.
66. Id. In a subsequent footnote, the Court suggested that if a regulation meant that the
property had "ceas[ed] to be 'economically viable,'" then relief would be granted. d at 138
n.36.
67. Id. at 124.
68. Id
69. Id at 130-31.
70. Id at 138. The Court's statement begged the question of what constituted a "reason-
able, beneficial use." The Court found that the regulation "did not interfere with... Penn
Central's primary expectation concerning the use of the parcel," which was "as a railroad
terminal containing office space and concessions." Id at 136. Nor did the denial of this par-
ticular permit signify an "intention to prohibit any construction above the Terminal." Id at
137. In addition, the Court found that the availability of transferable development rights "mit-
igated whatever financial burdens the law [had] imposed on appellants," because the company
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ing regulatory takings claims in Agins v. Tiburon.71 In Agins, petitioners
argued that a zoning ordinance permitting the construction of only five
single-family residences on their five-acre tract had destroyed the value of
their parcel.72 The Court succinctly stated that a regulatory taking may
be found if "the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests, or denies an owner economically viable use of his land."' 73 Ap-
plying this test, the Court found that the appellants' property was not the
only property affected by the ordinance, that the appellants had not been
prevented from making use of their land, and that the appellants had not
been deprived of any "fundamental rights of ownership. '
Subsequent decisions in both the Supreme Court and in lower courts
have alternated the use of the Penn Central and Agins tests.75 The Court
could build a taller office building atop one of its other holdings by applying its unused air
rights above the terminal to other properties it owned within the city. Id.
Also notable is the fact that the statute at issue in Penn Central expressly provided that if
an owner of a landmark could show that he was not "earning a reasonable return on the
property in its present state," then the city government was responsible for developing a plan
that would enable the oWner "to earn a reasonable return on the landmark site." Id. at 112-13
n.13. If the owner rejected the city's plan, then either the city was to acquire the property
through eminent domain or else lift the regulation. Id. The trial court in Penn Central had
found that the "cost to Penn Central of operating the Terminal building itself, exclusive of
purely railroad operations, exceeded the revenues received from concessionaires and tenants in
the Terminal." Id. at 119 n.20. The appellate court reevaluated the company's proffered ac-
counting figures and rejected the claim that the terminal was operating at a loss. Id. at 119.
At the Supreme Court level, the transportation owners admitted that the Terminal "must be
regarded as capable of earning a reasonable return." Id. at 129. This seemed to be the com-
pany's fatal error, because the Court emphasized, in its now-famous footnote, that its holding
was
based on the present record, which in turn is based on Penn Central's present ability
to use the terminal for its intended purposes and in a gainful fashion. The city con-
ceded at oral argument that if appellants can demonstrate at some point in the future
that circumstances have so changed that the terminal ceases to be "economically
viable," appellants may obtain relief.
Id at 138 n.36.
71. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
72. Id. at 257-58.
73. Id. at 260 (citing Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928); Penn Central, 438
U.S. at 138 n.36).
74. Id at 262. Two years later, when asked to rule on whether the "mere enactment" of a
Surface Mining Act had deprived the complaining coal companies of "all economically viable
use" of their property, the Supreme Court answered in the negative. Hodel v. Virginia Sur-
face Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 297 (1981). The Court, however, was careful
to note that its holding did not preclude "other coal mine operators from attempting to show
that as applied to particular parcels of land, the Act and the Secretary's regulations effect a
taking." Id. at n.40.
75. See, eg., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 492-97
(1987) (combining both the Agins and the Penn Central tests); Connolly v. Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. 475 U.S. 211, 224-25 (1986) (using the Penn Central balancing factors to define
"economically viable use"); Loveladies Harbor v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 155 (1991)
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applied the Agins economic viability test as part of its takings analysis in
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis.76 The Court decided in
that case that a facial attack on a statute did not indicate: that petitioners
had been deprived of all "economically viable use" of their property."
The statute in question required that a certain amount of coal be left
under certain structures in order to prevent subsidence. The Court held
that the Association's facial attack on the act failed to prove that it had
been deprived of all "economically viable use" because it did not claim
that it was "impracticable for them to continue mining their bituminous
coal interests in western Pennsylvania."78
The Keystone Court then addressed the question of what property
should comprise the denominator of the takings fraction, since the Asso-
ciation claimed that the statute in question had deprived them of a sepa-
rate support estate that was recognized by state law.7 9 According to
petitioners, Pennsylvania recognized three estates: the surface estate, the
support estate, and the mineral estate.80 Theoretically at least, each of
the estates could be owned by a different party. Under this scenario, the
owner of the support estate could sell her interests either to the holder of
the mineral estate, who could then commence mining operations, or sell
to the holder of the surface estate, who could then prohibit the mineral
estate holder from mining in a way that would result in damage to the
above surface.81 The majority noted that while the support estate could
in theory be owned by a separate party, "invariably" the support estate
was owned either by the holder of the surface estate or by the holder of
the mineral estate. 2 The Court upheld the lower court's decision to
view the support estate as " 'only one "strand" in the plaintiff's "bundle"
of property rights, which also include[d] the mineral estate.' "83 The
(applying only the Agins test); see also Peterson, supra note 2, at 1316-33 (discussing the
Supreme Court's two tests and how they have been applied inconsistently).
76. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
77. Id. at 494-96.
78. Id. at 496.
79. Id. at 478.
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. Id. at 500.
83. Id. (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 771 F.2d 707, 716 (3d
Cir. 1986), affid, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)). The Keystone Court also approved of the distinction
drawn by the Third Circuit between Keystone and Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922), in which the court found a regulatory taking. According to the Third Circuit, the
language in Mahon
seems to suggest that the Court would have found a taking no matter how little of the
defendants' coal was rendered unmineable-that because "certain" coal was no
longer accessible, there had been a taking of that coal. However, when one reads the
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Keystone Court appears to have said that if a property interest is in real-
ity inseparable from one or more other distinct interests that are not im-
paired by the regulation in question, then such a property interest cannot
be the sole subject of a takings claim."
After Agins, certain issues continued to puzzle the lower courts.
First, because none of the Supreme Court decisions applying the Agins
test offered a clear definition of the term "economically viable," lower
courts wrestled with the term. In 1983, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit addressed the question of "economically via-
ble use" in Pompa Construction Corp. v. City of Saratoga Springs.85 The
plaintiffs had purchased a sixty-eight acre tract on which they planned to
operate a quarry. 6 A zoning ordinance designating the area as a conser-
vancy district prohibited quarries, and the plaintiffs brought suit alleging
that the property had been taken, because it was no longer "economically
viable." 7 The Second Circuit defined economic viability as the plaintiffs'
ability to sell the property to someone else for its remaining uses rather
than as the profitability of the property's remaining uses for the plain-
tiffs.88 Deciding that the plaintiffs would be able to sell the property, the
court concluded that the property was still economically viable.8 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit also chose
to equate economic viability with marketability. In MacLeod v. Santa
Clara County,90 MacLeod had acquired property as a long term invest-
sentence in context, it becomes clear that the Court's concern was with whether the
defendants' "right to mine coal... [could] be exercised with profit." ... Thus, the
Court's holding in Mahon must be assumed to have been based on its understanding
that the Kohler Act rendered the business of mining coal unprofitable.
Keystone, 771 F.2d at 716 n.6 (quoting Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414) (citations omitted).
84. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 500-01.
85. 706 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1983).
86. Id. at 420.
87. See id. at 421-23. The plaintiffs contended that their property was unsuitable for any
of the uses permitted within the conservancy district; therefore, its only possible economically
beneficial use was as a quarry. Id. at 423-25.
88. Id. at 423-24.
89. Id. at 424-25. One year later, the Second Circuit reiterated its definition of economi-
cally viable in Sandowsky v. City of New York, 732 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1984). The plaintiffs
had purchased two vacant, single-room occupancy buildings with the intent of converting
them into more profitable residential uses. Id. at 312. Alleging that a subsequent three-year
moratorium on conversion of these types of buildings had destroyed the economic viability of
their property, plaintiffs brought a takings claim against the city. Id. at 317. Citing Pompa
Construction, the court concluded that because plaintiffs had failed to show that their property
was unmarketable, "sale of the properties was a possible use." Id. 318 n.3. Thus, the court
continued, the fact that "appellants might have to sell their property because of financial hard-
ship" and "might be unable to recoup their costs" was not enough to show that the property
had no economically viable use. Id. at 318.
90. 749 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984).
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ment; in the interim he had leased the land for cattle grazing and at-
tempted to run his own cattle operation.91 Neither activity proved
sufficient to cover the costs of maintaining the property.92 MacLeod then
pursued the possibility of large-scale timber harvesting.93 Although he
received the requisite permits from the State of California, the county
denied his permit.94 The Ninth Circuit found that the permit denial "did
not affect MacLeod's ability to continue to hold the property for invest-
ment purposes, with interim use as a cattle ranch, and grazing land,"
although concededly MacLeod was now placed in a difficult short-term
financial situation. 95
The question of the "denominator" of the takings fraction, with
which the Supreme Court had wrestled in Keystone, troubled lower
courts as well. For example, in Deltona Corp. v. United States,96 a devel-
opment company subdivided its original purchase into five tracts.9" The
company obtained the necessary permits to fill and develop the first three
tracts of land, but the passage of Section 404 of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments of 1972 prohibited it from filling in the
remaining two tracts.9" When the company brought a takings claim
based on the permit denial, the court based its decision that there was no
taking upon a consideration of the total economic value of all five
tracts.99
A similar situation was presented by Jentgen v. United States.co
Jentgen had paid $150,000 for approximately 102 acres.10 1 Twenty of
the acres were uplands and could be developed without the need for per-
mits; the remaining acres were wetlands and necessitated approval by the
Army Corps of Engineers before any development could take place.'012
After being denied a permit to develop the entire eighty acres, 03 Jentgen
91. Id. at 542-43.
92. Id. at 543.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 547.
96. 657 F.2d 1184 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cerL denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
97. Id. at 1188.
98. Id. at 1188-89.
99. Id. at 1192. The court stated, "Indeed, the residual economic value of the land is
enormous, both proportionately and absolutely.... In the aggregate, [the two tracts in ques-
tion] contain only 20% of the total acreage of Deltona's original purchase in 1964 and 33% of
the developable lots." Id.
100. 657 F.2d 1210 (Ct. Cl. 1981), cerL denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
101. Id. at 1211.
102. Id. at 1212.
103. The Corps had offered Jentgen a modified permit allowing him to develop 20 of the 80
acres. Id.
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filed a takings claim and sought approximately $6,000,000 in compensa-
tion. °4 The court refused to limit its consideration to the eighty acres
for which the permit was denied'05 and explained that because twenty of
the one hundred acres were still developable, no taking would be
found.10 6
Regulations that require, or have the effect of requiring, that an en-
tire piece of property be left in its natural state have tended to constitute
takings that necessitate compensation. In Q. C. Construction Co. v.
GalJo, 107 for example, a moratorium on sewer tie-ins prevented a land-
owner from developing his residential lots. 0 ' The court found that "if
the only remaining use for one's land is to provide an empty lot for the
benefit of one's neighbors, then the property has become truly worthless
and useless to the owner."'' 1 9
In Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States,"0 the Court of Claims
addressed the question of what property should comprise the denomina-
tor of the takings fraction in the context of a regulation that essentially
required land to be left in its natural state. As in Deltona, the plaintiffs
had purchased a large tract of land and subdivided, filled, and sold all but
fifty-one acres."' Subsequent federal and state wetlands regulations re-
quired that the landowner obtain permits in order to develop wetland
areas.1 2 In contrast to the court in Deltona, the Loveladies court de-
clined to consider the full extent of the plaintiffs' original purchase as the
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1213 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130-31).
106. Id Even though the regulation had allegedly diminished the value of the entire tract
by 98%, the court stated that the value of the 20 acres of developable uplands was close to
$150,000, the original amount Jentgen had paid for the entire parcel. Id.
107. 649 F. Supp. 1331 (D.R.I. 1986), afj'd, 836 F.2d 1340 (1st Cir. 1987).
108. Id. at 1331-32.
109. Id at 1337. The court appeared to be strongly influenced by the fact that Gallo, the
town building inspector, had assured the plaintiff that the permits would be forthcoming fol-
lowing the plaintiff's completion of repairs to the sewer system. Id at 1333. The plaintiff
construction company expended approximately $20,000 for repairs, only to be informed that
the tie-in moratorium had been implemented. Idk at 1334. The plaintiff also had no notice
that the moratorium was under consideration. 1d; see also Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United
States, 791 F.2d 893, 895 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that compensation was required when
wetlands regulation prohibited Florida Rock from limestone mining, and the property was
unsuitable for any other activity), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987). But see Kirby Forest
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (holding that plaintiff's ability to remove
timber from the property defeated a takings claim even though the property could not be
developed); Hendricks v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 143, 156-57 (1987) (holding that the fact
that recreational uses could still be made of the property helped defeat takings claim).
110. 15 Cl. Ct. 381 (1988).
111. Id at 383.
112. See id at 383-84.
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subject of the takings claim." 3 The Loveladies court cited two reasons
for its decision to limit its takings analysis only to the acreage for which a
dredge-and-fill permit had been denied. 14 First, it attempted to distin-
guish Deltona by stating that the Deltona court's consideration of the
developer's original purchase was only the first of "[a] 'few statis-
tics,' """ and thus could not "be read to require a rigid rule that the
parcel as a whole must include all land originally owned by plaintiffs.""' 6
Second, the Loveladies court cited Keystone as standing for the proposi-
tion that the court was not required to consider the entire original
purchase. 117
When faced with a regulation requiring property to be left essen-
tially in its natural state, the Loveladies court reached the same result as
the court in Q.C. Construction Co. v. Gallo, finding that "the only use
remaining for the 12.5 acres [in question] was for the land to remain in
its natural state as an empty lot. This court is compelled to view such
property as taken.""'  The fact that the 12.5 acre parcel under consider-
ation contained one acre of unregulated uplands did not alter the court's
113. Id at 391; see also Gallo, 649 F. Supp. at 1332 (considering only 12 of 30 lots origi-
nally purchased).
114. The Loveladies court also refused to include an additional 6.4 acres of the original
purchase that was still owned by the plaintiff at the time of the alleged taking. Loveladies, 15
Cl. Ct. at 393. The court excluded the 6.4 acres because they were not contiguous with the
tract of land at issue. Id. (citing American Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. County of Marin, 653 F.2d
364, 369 (9th Cir. 1981)). The Loveladies court also distinguished the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of non-adjacent properties in Penn Central. In Penn Central, "the parcel as a whole
designated by the court only included [the tax block] and failed to include these other scattered
non-contiguous properties." Id.
115. Id, at 392. "The other comparisons only included property which was held by the
landowner when the claimed taking already occurred." Id. (quoting Deltona, 657 F.2d 1184,
1188-89 (1981), cert denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982)). The Loveladies court seemed to rely heav-
ily on the Deltona court's finding that "even within [the areas claimed to be taken], there are
located 111 acres of uplands which can be developed without obtaining a Corps permit." Del-
tona, 657 F.2d at 1192.
116. Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 392.
117. Id The court asserted:
Mhe Supreme Court did not include all the property which was held at the time of
the original purchase, i.e., all of the coal which was in the ground when the property
was originally purchased in the early 1900s. Rather, the Supreme Court defined the
value of the parcel as a whole as "the value that remain[ed] in the property when the
taking was said to have occurred."
Id (quoting Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987)).
118. Id at 395. The Loveladies court rejected the defendant's claim that the land could
still be used for recreational purposes, stating that "it is highly doubtful that hunting would
have been permitted on the property after the permit denial since the denial was in part moti-
vated to preserve certain endangered species which existed in the wetlands." Id.; see also Flor-
ida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 895 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("The sole purpose
[for plaintiff's purchase of the tract] was to obtain its limestone deposits for extraction, and no
other use, or sale, has ever been considered.").
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conclusion.11 9 The court rejected the defendant's contention that this
one acre could be utilized as a residential site, stating that "[a] taking of
such property is found where the government's regulations imposed on
the surrounding wetlands have cut off all the routes of access... which
remain."120
The case law preceding Lucas leads to two observations: (1) the
phrase "economically viable use" has generally been equated with "fair
market value," 121 and (2) the question of what should comprise the de-
nominator in the takings analysis has led to inconsistent answers. 122
When analyzing the majority opinion in Lucas, it is essential to remem-
ber the factual finding on which the Court based its holding. The trial
court found that the regulation at issue had rendered the property "val-
ueless." '123 The South Carolina Supreme Court did not disturb this find-
ing, nor did the United States Supreme Court. 124 Accepting this finding
of "valueless," the Court adopted a categorical rule that any regulation
which "denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land" is a
per se taking, unless the state can show that the regulation prevents a
common-law nuisance. 125  The Court's "nuisance exception" halts a
state's ability to define summarily a regulation as an exercise of the po-
lice-power in instances of total deprivation,126 is the most immediately
striking aspect of Lucas, and raises a multitude of issues.' 2 7 Before a
119. Loveladies, 15 Cl. Ct. at 396.
120. d (citing Laney v. United States, 228 C1. Ct. 519, 523 (1981)); see also Formanek v.
United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332, 339 (1992) (finding that unregulated upland portion of claim-
ant's tract had also been taken since the government had failed to show that a market existed
for it).
121. See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 96-106, 110-16 and accompanying text.
123. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
124. Id. at 2896 n.9 ("This finding was the premise of the Petition for Certiorari, and since
it was not challenged in the Brief in Opposition we decline to entertain the argument in respon-
dent's brief on the merits... that the finding was erroneous.").
125. Id. at 2893, 2897; see supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text. In Lucas, the Court
at least partially resolved the confusion fostered by its two previous takings "tests." In creat-
ing its categorical rule, the Court indicates that the Penn Central multi-factor balancing ap-
proach is inappropriate in situations where the landowner has demonstrated total deprivation.
See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893. For a discussion of the Penn Central test, see supra notes 65-70
and accompanying text.
126. See, eg., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410 (1915) (upholding ordinance
prohibiting a formally lawful brickyard even though the property could not be utilized for any
other purpose); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 664 (1887) (upholding ordinance prohibiting
previously lawful brewery even though "the establishments will become of no value as prop-
erty"). In these cases, the Court held that the local governments had the right to declare what
constituted a nuisance. See Hadacheck, 239 U.S. at 411; Mugler, 123 U.S. at 658.
127. For example, although Lucas clearly held that state nuisance law would apply to a
state statute preventing an owner from all beneficial or productive use of her property, the
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property owner need consider any aspects of the "nuisance exception,"
however, he must first show that he meets the criteria of the Court's
categorical rule. Does Lucas offer any guidance as to how property own-
ers may reach the "promised land" of its categorical rule? A subtle revi-
sion of the language of prior rulings and commentary on the proper
"denominator" of takings analysis offer two possibilities.
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia stated that this categorical
rule was not a new rule, but rather a reaffirmation of the Court's state-
ment in Agins v. Tiburon: "[T]he Fifth Amendment is violated when
land-use regulation 'does not substantially advance legitimate state inter-
ests or denies an owner economically viable use of his land.' "12
Although superficially correct, Justice Scalia's statement that the major-
ity was merely reaffirming the Agins test is not entirely accurate. The
Agins Court had simply stated that a loss of all "economically viable use"
would be considered a taking.129 By rephrasing the test as requiring a
showing that a regulation has denied a property owner all "economically
beneficial or productive" use, Justice Scalia altered the language used by
the Court in Agins. 130 Although courts do at times rephrase the lan-
guage of their "tests," the Court had, until Lucas, consistently retained
the specific wording of the Agins economic viability test.'31 The Lucas
Court's recharacterization of the Agins test thus raises a number of
troubling questions.
opinion was unclear as to what type of nuisance law would apply to a taking under a federal
statute. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901. Would a court apply the nuisance principles embodied
in the state's common law, or would some type of federal nuisance principles be applied? In
addition, if common-law nuisance principles indicated that the prohibited activity was one that
had traditionally been allowed to continue so long as the owner paid damages, then would this
activity fall under the scope of the Court's nuisance exception? See, e.g., RE STATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. d (1967). These questions are well worth exploring, but are beyond
the scope of this Note.
128. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). Two dissenting Justices took issue with the Court's asser-
tion that it was merely reaffirming Agins. Id. at 2911 n.l1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at
2918-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra notes 39-48 and accompanying text. While con-
ceding that the Agins language had been repeated in later cases, Justice Blackmun maintained
that neither Agins nor the later decisions "suggest[ed] that the public interest is irrelevant if
total value has been taken." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2911 n.ll (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens reiterated this point and stated that while the Agins dicta had contained the either/or
sentence, the Court's "rulings [had] rejected such an absolute position." Id at 2918-19 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
129. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
130. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 (emphasis added).
131. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987); United States v. Riverside
Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985); Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States,
467 U.S. 1, 14 (1984).
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Must courts that have consistently equated "economically viable"
with fair market value' 32 now implement a new test of "beneficial and
productive use?" If the phrase "economically beneficial and productive"
is different from "economically viable," does this mean that a property
owner is no longer required to show that his property has absolutely no
fair market value in order to take advantage of the Court's categorical
rule?133 If "all economically beneficial and productive use" is not synon-
ymous with fair market value, then what does the phrase "beneficial and
productive" mean?' 34 Would a "beneficial and productive use" test
harken back to the "reasonable return" language found in Penn Cen-
tral,3 ' so that claimants who feel that their property is incapable of a
"reasonable return" may claim that they have been deprived of "all bene-
ficial or productive use?"' 36 Because the Agins test of economic viability
was clearly satisfied by the trial court's finding that the property had
been rendered "valueless," the Lucas court did not have to explain the
meaning of "economically beneficial or productive." Subsequent courts
now face the question of whether this phrase differs in meaning from
Agins, and if so, how.
Assuming that the Court's revision of language was an innocuous
change, i.e., property must still be completely valueless in order to qualify
132. See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
133. Of course, after making this showing, the property owner will still have to defend
against a governmental entity's assertion that the regulation is preventing a common-law nui-
sance. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2896-2902; supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
134. Justices Blackmun and Stevens strongly criticized the majority for assuming "that the
only uses of property cognizable under the Constitution are developmental uses." Lucas, 112
S. Ct. at 2919 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see supra
notes 41-42 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia denied that the Court was making such an
assumption. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8.
135. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 129; see supra note 70 and accompanying text. The Penn
Central Court's language troubled commentators, who questioned courts' ability to define
"reasonable" rates of return for individual parcels. See The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92
HARv. L. REv. 57, 230-31 (1978). Before Penn Central was handed down, one commentator
proposed a "reasonable beneficial use" standard by which courts could determine whether
compensation was due. See John J. Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation
Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1021,
1050-51 (1975). The numerous difficulties in implementing such a standard were then de-
scribed by Curtis J. Berger in The Accommodation Power in Land Use Controversies: A Reply
to Professor Costonis, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 799, 817-21 (1976).
136. For example, suppose the South Carolina Coastal Council had implemented a regula-
tion that restricted the size of habitable structures on Lucas' lots. Could he have shown that
since he would have to sell the lots at a loss (since his purchase price had been based on the
assumption that the lots were to be used for luxury homes), he would be entitled to compensa-
tion because he had been denied "beneficial" use of his land? The fact that the Court quoted
the following from Sir Edward Coke suggests its acceptance of this view: "'[Flor what is the
land but the profits thereof[?]'" Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 (quoting 1 E. COKE, INsTruTEs ch.
1, § 1 (1st Am. ed. 1812)).
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for the Court's categorical rule, did the Court offer any other suggestions
as to how a property owner might qualify? The answer may lie in the
Court's commentary on the denominator of the takings fraction-the ex-
tent of the land to be considered in takings analysis.137 Justice Scalia
offered an artfully ambiguous explanation as to the" 'property interest'
to be considered: 138
When... a regulation requires a developer to leave 90% of a
rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we would
analyze the situation as one in which the owner has been de-
prived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened por-
tion of the tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a
mere diminution in value of the tract as a whole.' 39
Under this reasoning, could a property owner subject to a setback
regulation prohibiting any type of development on the front twenty-five
feet of her lot now fall under the Court's categorical rule by claiming that
she has been deprived of "all economically beneficial use" of the "bur-
dened" twenty-five feet of property? Previous cases have rejected at-
tempts to segment property in this manner;' 4° has the Court now
resurrected this possibility? Perhaps the Court's chosen example indi-
cates that all portions of a tract must be left with some sort of economic
use. For example, in Jentgen v. United States, 4' the landowner was al-
lowed to develop twenty of his hundred acres but was denied a permit to
dredge-and-fill sixty of the remaining eighty acres. Because the permit
denial meant that sixty acres had to be left in "essentially a natural
state," could Jentgen now claim the benefit of the Court's categorical rule
by arguing that only the "burdened" sixty acres should be considered? 42
In addition, as Justice Stevens indicated, the Court's language im-
plies that a total deprivation of "any real property interest," such as any
137. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
138. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
139. Id.
140. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 498 (1987) (cit-
ing Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 604, 608-10 (1927)); supra notes 75-84 and accompanying
text; see also Peterson, supra note 2, at 1346-47 (describing "cases in which no taking occurs
even though the claimant has effectively been deprived of a discrete portion of a parcel of land
or other tangible thing").
141. 657 F.2d 1210, 1213 (Ct. Cl. 1981); see discussion supra notes 100-06 and accompany-
ing text.
142. This portion of the majority opinion deeply troubled Justice Stevens, who stated:
In response to the rule, courts may define "property" broadly and only rarely find
regulations to effect total takings .... On the other hand, developers and investors
may market specialized estates to take advantage of the court's new rule. The
smaller the estate, the more likely that a regulatory change will effect a total taking.
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2919 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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one "stick" in the bundle of property rights, might constitute a taking. 143
The Court suggested that
[t]he answer to this difficult question [of deciding what prop-
erty interests should comprise the whole] may lie in how the
owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped by the
State's law of property--Le., whether and to what degree the
State's law has accorded legal recognition and protection to the
particular interest in land with respect to which the takings
claimant alleges a diminution in (or elimination of) value. 1"
Under this reasoning, the plaintiffs in Keystone might have prevailed
on their claim, since they were able to show that a separate "support"
estate was recognizable under Pennsylvania state law.145 It should be
noted, however, that Lucas does not automatically guarantee that a state-
protected property interest may serve as the denominator for a takings
claim; rather, Lucas merely suggests a possible willingness to entertain
such claims.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens painted a bleak picture of a plethora
of takings claims based on the "market[ing] [of] specialized estates
[designed to] take advantage of the Court's new rule." '146 The Court's
language indicates that its willingness to consider claims based on less
than a fee simple interest will be predicated on such an interest being
recognized by the state's common law;147 thus, Justice Stevens' fear of
the creation of a number of new estates may be unfounded. The empha-
143. Id. at 2920 n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens accused the majority of engag-
ing in "subtle revision of the 'total regulatory takings' dicta." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). He
pointed out that in Agins the Court had stated that a regulation which "denies an owner eco-
nomically viable use of his land" might be a taking. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Agins
v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)). But, Justice Stevens maintained, the majority's lan-
guage seemed to indicate that other estates could also serve as the bases for takings claims. Id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
The issue of conceptual severance, that is, whether the taking of one "stick" in the bundle
can be considered a taking, has been problematic from the inception of regulatory takings.
See, eg., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 419-20 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Conceptual severance has also been addressed by many commentators. At the extreme end of
the spectrum, Richard Epstein maintains that any government restriction of property rights
whatsoever requires compensation. See EPSTEIN, supra note 2, at 95. For a discussion of the
philosophical underpinnings of the conceptual severance idea, see Carol M. Rose, Mahon Re-
constructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 561, 583-92 (1984).
144. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
145. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
146. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2919 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147. Id. at 2894 n.7 (discussing as a basis for the claim "whether and to what degree the
State's law [of property] has accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular inter-




sis on "the owner's reasonable expectations"' 48 will also serve to discour-
age such chicanery.
The ultimate effect of Lucas on future takings jurisprudence is am-
biguous. It appears that Lucas is yet another attempt by the Court to
fashion a set of categorical rules for takings analysis. 149 Yet because Lu-
cas was based on a finding that the property had been "render[ed] value-
less,"'15 the Court's categorical rule may prove to be an exceedingly
narrow one, one that is limited only to the facts of Lucas."'1
Will other property owners be able to reach the "promised land" of
Lucas? The Court's subtle and inexplicable shift in language, from "eco-
nomically viable use" to "economically beneficial and productive use," '152
at least raises the question of whether some new and more achievable
standard has been set. Future cases will indicate whether a property
owner will have to prove that the value of her land is absolutely nil in
order to take advantage of the Court's rule.
The Court also left open the question of what types of "property
interest" may serve as the denominator in a takings analysis.15 If, as
Lucas suggests, courts may choose to look only at the regulated portion
of the property, then land-use planners and public officials must carefully
draft regulations ensuring that even the most severely regulated portions
of a piece of property are left with some sort of economic use. If broadly
interpreted, the Court's suggestions could be grossly inequitable; a pref-
erable method of analysis would weight the economic benefits derived
from the entire purchase against the remaining regulated portion. The
Court could also clarify matters considerably by clearly enumerating
which "sticks" in the bundle of rights will fall under the scope of its new
rule.
Perhaps, as Justice Scalia asserts, the Lucas rule will be applied only
in "extraordinary circumstance[s]." 154 It is more likely, however, that
148. Id.
149. See Frank Michelman, Taking, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. I~v. 1600, 1622 (1988) (arguing
that the following cases are evidence of a trend towards a more formalistic approach: Nollan
v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987) (holding that a building permit condi-
tion requiring the landowners to grant beach access did not advance a legitimate state interest);
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 322
(1987) (holding that damages were available for temporary takings); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S.
704, 717-18 (1987) (holding that regulation abrogating the right to devise property was com-
pensable taking)).
150. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2896.
151. See Dwight Merriam, Lucas: Has Takings Law Been Set Adrift Once More?, CONN.
L. TRIB., July 13, 1992, at 20.
152. See supra notes 128-36 and accompanying text.
153. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
154. Id. at 2894 (Souter, J., separate statement).
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the decision has opened the floodgates for an enormous amount of
ingeniously crafted takings claims. In his separate statement, Justice
Souter clearly focused on the major weakness of the Court's decision:
"Because the questionable conclusion of total deprivation cannot be re-
viewed, the Court is precluded from attempting to clarify the concept of
total (and, in the Court's view, categorically compensable) taking on
which it rests.1155
By refusing to address the issue of what constitutes a deprivation of
"all economically beneficial and productive use," the Court performed a
disservice to takings jurisprudence by leaving this important question un-
answered.
LAURIE G. BALLENGER
155. Id. at 2925 (Souter, J., separate statement).
[Vol. 71
